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AESTHETIC RESTRICTIONS AND THE 
USE OF SOLAR DEVICES 
Nancy Lee Jones· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the United States seeks to reduce its dependence upon foreign 
sources of energy and to discover and implement renewable energy 
resources, the installation of devices which utilize solar technology 
has generated increased interest. Critical examination of the legal 
implications of widescale solar development has focused on issues 
related to the right of access to sunlight.! However, other issues are 
necessarily suggested by the expanded use of sunlight as an energy 
source. 
An issue which is emerging as a potentially serious impediment 
to the use of solar devices is the effect of legally enforceable restric-
tions intended to promote an aesthetically pleasing environment 
upon a property owner's right to use his land. 2 Prohibitions upon 
• Legislative Attorney for the American Law Division of the Congressional Research Serv-
ice, Library of Congress. B.A. Georgetown University, 1972; J.D. Georgetown University Law 
Center, 1975; Member, Virginia Bar. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author 
and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the Congressional Research Service or the 
Library of Congress. 
I For a solar collector to work efficiently, it must have a certain amount of sunlight. This 
could create difficulties for persons who want to put solar collectors on their buildings in cities 
or in suburbs where the amount of land surrounding the building is limited, for if the owner 
of surrounding land builds or lets a tree grow, the solar collector could be shaded. The legal 
issues surrounding this problem, often referred to as the right to access to sunlight, have been 
extensively discussed by commentators although there are few actual cases. See, e.g., Beyers, 
The Common Law of Solar Access: Insufficient Protection for Users of Solar Energy, 6 REAL 
EST. L.J. 320 (1978); Moskowitz, Legal Access to Light: The Solar Energy Imperative, 9 NAT. 
RESOURCES L. 177 (1976); Becker, Common Law Sun Rights: An Obstacle to Solar Heating 
and Cooling, 3 J. OF CONTEMP. L. 19 (1976); Eisenstadt and Utton, Solar Rights and Their 
Effect on Solar Heating and Cooling, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 363 (1976). 
2 M. Maidique, Solar America, in ENERGY FUTURE: THE REPORT OF THE ENERGY PROJECT AT 
33 
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various uses of property both traditionally and more recently sanc-
tioned by the law may irreconcilably conflict with an owner's desire 
to construct a building incorporating solar technology or to install 
a solar device on an existing structure.3 
Restrictions for aesthetic purposes are of two general types: those 
imposed by private agreement in the form of restrictive covenants;4 
and those imposed by zoning statutes or ordinances adopted pur-
suant to the state's general police power to protect the health, safety 
and general welfare ofthe citizenry.5 Whatever the source, in accom-
plishing its avowed purpose an aesthetic restriction may not only 
impede but also render impossible the installation of a practical 
solar device. 
Specific case law addressing the conflict between aesthetic con-
trols and the implementation of novel solar technology is scant. 
Nevertheless, controversies involving the issue have already arisen 
in several states.' As installation of solar devices in new and existing 
structures becomes more practical, the conflict between the right of 
THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL 193-94 (R. Stobaugh & D. Yergin eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited 
as ENERGY FUTURE]. This controversial report states that "[p]owerful institutional barriers 
... impede the acceptance of solar heating." [d. at 193. Discussing these institutional, as 
opposed to economic, barriers, ENERGY FUTURE focuses upon building codes: 
One of the most formidable [institutional barriers] is building codes. Each American 
locality has its own code-the result of geography, climate, building materials, and local 
political forces. Of the over ten thousand municipal building codes, only a handful provide 
for solar energy. When codes do not include solar energy, powerful disincentives can be 
created. A New Hampshire man, for example, wanted to install solar hot-water heating. 
He applied for a building permit to make the necessary modifications in the sturcture of 
his house, but an official in the town planner's office told him that solar energy was not 
in the building code's lexicon. So, after going through all the documents, hearings, and 
other procedures required to obtain variances from building codes, he decided he did not 
want solar after all. And even when building codes provide for solar, they can be discourag-
ing. Initially, the planning committee for Coral Gables, Florida, rejected solar roof-top 
collectors outright. It then reversed its decision, but set such strict controls on aesthetics 
that costs were substantially increased. 
[d. at 193-94 (footnotes omitted). 
• Besides the examples set forth in ENERGY REPORT, supra note 2, dealing specifically with 
building codes, other instances of aesthetic controls prohibiting the use of solar technology 
are readily imaginable. Restrictions upon rooftop structures, structural alterations visible 
from other locations, or increases in the height of an existing structure might preclude instal-
lation of devices designed to collect sunlight. Furthermore, in particular circumstances, phys-
icallimitations of structural design or exposure could necessitate the placement of a collecting 
unit on the ground. In such cases, controls dictating the allowable proximity of structures to 
boundary lines or adjoining streets would be important. 
• See text at notes 7-13, infra. 
• See text at notes 32-42, infra. 
• See text at notes 60-83, infra. 
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a community or group of landowners to protect themselves from 
unwanted structures and an individual's desire to avail himself of 
the benefits of solar technology will undoubtedly become more 
acute. 
This article will examine this increasingly important issue, focus-
ing upon applicable legal concepts and demonstrating their inade-
quacy in addressing the conflict between competing interests 
aroused when aesthetic controls confront a useful technology which 
responds to national needs. First, prohibitions arising by private 
agreement will be examined, and a review of existing remedies will 
suggest the need for a legislative solution. Second, the role of zoning 
regulation and the difficulties encountered in circumventing spe-
cific restrictions will highlight the problems inherent in judicial 
resolution of this confrontation on a case by case basis. Finally, both 
practical private and legislative solutions to the controversy will be 
explored, discussing recently enacted and proposed state legislation. 
II. AESTHETIC RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY PRIVATE AGREEMENT 
A. Nature and Prevalence of Restrictive Covenants 
Restrictive covenants have been characterized as "control over 
activities (and structures) on land as a result of private agree-
ment."7 Typically, there are three principal modes through which a 
restrictive covenant can arise: as a general development scheme 
drawn up by a developer of a subdivision; as an agreement between 
landowners; and as a requirement incorporated into conveyancing 
documents when property is transferred. A covenant may be con-
cerned with such specific uses of land as the permissible height of 
structures or requisite setbacks8 from property boundaries. On the 
other hand, the covenant may be more generally phrased, perhaps 
requiring the property owner subject to its terms to submit plans of 
proposed structural alterations or additions to an architectural re-
view board for approval prior to commencement of construction.· 
7 5 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW-LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER § 154.01 
(1974). [Hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS.] Restrictive covenants, like other promises respect-
ing the use of land, were originally a type of contract. For a discussion of their historical 
developments see 6 P. ROHAN, HOME OWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND PLANNED UNITED DEVELOPMENTS 
LAw AND PRACTICE § 8.01 (1977). 
• A setback is "[a] distance from a curb, property line, or structure, within which buildin( 
is prohibited." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1230 (5th ed. 1979). See text at note 13, infra. 
• For an example, see text at note 70, infra. 
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Regardless of its source or specific content, a restrictive covenant 
may well impede the prospective solar user in several ways.IO 
Certain technical requirements have been noted as necessary for 
the legal validity of a restrictive covenant. 1I However, there is some 
doubt as to judicial willingness to require strict compliance with 
these requirements. 12 In any event, covenants which tended to re-
strict the installation of solar devices would most likely fulfill these 
technical requirements and would therefore not be susceptible to 
challenge on these grounds. 
A form published as an example for a restrictive covenant reveals 
in several provisions the pitfalls which the prospective solar user 
subject to its terms may encounter: 
No structure shall be moved onto any lot unless it shall conform to and 
be in harmony with existing structures in the tract .... No building, 
including porches, etc., shall be erected nearer any street or road than 
the set-back lines shown on the recorded plat .... [T]he plans and 
specifications for the erection or alteration of any building, fence, wall, 
or other structure must be approved in writing by the grantor . . . . 
Grantor, in its sole discretion, shall have the right to refuse plans which 
are not deemed by it as suitable or desirable. 13 
Specifically, the language "conform to and be in harmony with 
existing structures in the tract" will present problems to the first 
property owner on the block attempting to install a solar unit. De-
tailed restrictions as to setback lines could render installation of a 
solar device impossible in some circumstances. Finally, the absolute 
discretion vested in the other party to the covenant will subject a 
property owner bound by its terms to the whim and caprice of an-
other. 
While the legitimacy of attempts by individuals to have a voice 
I. See note 3, supra. 
II WILLIAMS, supra note 7, notes the following requirements: notice, a dominant tenement, 
privity of estate, the obligations must touch and concern the land, and the obligations must 
be negative. Id., §§ 154.03-.08. 
12 In Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Emigrant Ind's Sav. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 15 
N.E.2d 793 (1938), the New York Court of Appeals upheld a covenant which violated several 
of these technical requirements; nevertheless, some courts, even in New York, have continued 
to require these conditions. See WILLIAMS, supra note 7, § 154.09. 
IS 2 E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE, § 20-6 (3d ed. 1965). For a form with somewhat 
similar requirements see 2 JONES LEGAL FORMS, Form 33:52 (10th ed. 1962). For sample 
sections to be included in restrictive covenants including a clause on restrictions on roof 
construction see 7 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE LEGAL FORMS §§ 77:61-77-215 (2d ed. 1972). 
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in the future development of their neighborhood should be initially 
recognized, where competing interests conflict or covenants become 
outmoded by changes in circumstances, relief ought to be available 
to a property owner. The prospective solar owner would wish to avail 
himself of remedies which the law has provided in circumstances 
where restrictive covenants strictly applied effect harmful results. 
B. Overcoming Restrictive Covenants 
When a property owner discovers that existing covenants to which 
his land is subject preclude the installation of solar devices, he may 
attempt to avoid the restrictive covenant by several methods. Ob-
viously, if he can secure a release from all parties in interest, the 
restrictive terms would be ineffective for want of someone to enforce 
them. However, in the absence of such an agreement, the prospec-
tive solar user must choose between proceeding with construction 
and becoming vulnerable to suit, seeking a judicial declaration 
holding the covenant invalid, or foregoing solar installation. I. An 
often stated proposition concerning covenants is that they are to be 
construed strictly in favor of the free use of property. 15 In the context 
of an attempt to circumvent the restrictions of a covenant, this 
proposition may provide additional support. 
Basically, four equitable arguments could be advanced to either 
avoid or terminate the application of a restrictive covenant to par-
ticular property, summarized as follows: 
1. there has been a major change in the neighborhood; 
2. the covenant works a general hardship upon the landowner; 
3. the person or organization seeking to enforce the covenant 
has failed to proceed with reasonable promptness; 
4. the covenant is void as against public policy. 
The likelihood of success and availability of any of these arguments 
will depend in large part upon the facts and procedural posture of 
the particular case; nevertheless, each can be discussed in terms of 
general application. 
II Regarding the possibility of simply ignoring a restrictive covenant, one commentator has 
advised that "[t]his course of action is not recommended, since courts have been willing to 
go to great lengths to enforce a valid covenant." S. KRAEMER, SOLAR LAW-PRESENT AND 
FUTURE, WITH PROPOSED FORMS 62 (1978) [hereinafter cited as KRAEMER] . 
.. 7 G .. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 3160 (1962). See 
also Campbell v. Glacier Park Co., 381 F. Supp. 1243, 1249 (D. Idaho 1974); University Hills, 
Inc. v. Patton, 427 F.2d 1094, 1099 (6th Cir. 1970). 
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1. Changes in Conditions 
The rule pertaining to changes in conditions has been summa-
rized as follows: 
Injunctive relief against violation of the obligations arising out of a 
promise respecting the use of land cannot be secured if conditions have 
so changed since the making of the promise as to make it impossible 
[any] longer to secure in a substantial degree the benefits intended to 
be secured by the performance of the promise. II 
This rule has been commonly used in situations where a neighbor-
hood loses its residential character but retains its residential cove-
nants. The likelihood of success for the solar user advancing this 
argument is uncertain. One commentator has stated: 
Courts. . . have been extremely wary of granting such relief. . . . The 
potential solar energy user may find it difficult to fit himself in the 
changed circumstances category. He might argue that diminished en-
ergy supplies have fundamentally changed the surrounding area. A pro-
ponent of the restrictive covenant would counter that no change in the 
surrounding area has taken place and that the original purpose of the 
restriction remains valid. 17 
Thus, the availability of relief predicated upon a change in circum-
stances is uncertain. However, the original purpose of the restrictive 
covenant might well have been to prevent the construction of un-
sightly structures in a particular neighborhood. The use of solar 
devices due to the changed circumstances of the nation's energy 
supply situation would not necessarily negate this purpose. 
2. Relative Hardship 
A covenant working a relative hardship on one of the parties 
subject to its terms may be judicially terminated. The doctrine has 
been stated as follows: "[i]njunctive relief against violation of the 
obligation arising out of a promise respecting the use of land will be 
denied if the harm done by granting the injunction will be dispro-
II REsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 564 (1944). A detailed analysis of the termination of restric-
tive covenants due to a change in circumstances apPears in R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL 
PROPERTY § 684 (1977). 
17 Zillman & Deeny, Legal Aspects of Solar Energy Development, ARIZ. ST. L.J. 25, 38 
(1976). See also KRAEMER, supra note 14, at 62. "[T]he potential solar energy user may find 
it difficult to convince a court that a radical change has occurred." [d. 
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portionate to the benefit secured thereby."18 Forbidding a solar de-
vice could be characterized as working a hardship upon the poten-
tial solar user by forcing him to choose a more conventional and 
more costly energy source. The denial of a solar use may, in some 
opinions, result in an aesthetically more pleasing environment; 
however, in some cases where specific facts concerning energy costs, 
the physical appearance of a particular solar device, and the charac-
ter of the existing neighborhood are alleged and proved, a finding 
of harm disproportionate to benefit may reasonably follow. 
Yet, the doctrine itself is limited to cases involving injunctions 
and is not applicable to suits for damages: 
[r ]elief by way of damages operates to shift the harm suffered from the 
persons who suffered it to the person who caused it. There is in the 
granting of such relief no such disproportion of benefit and harm as may 
result from the granting of injunctive relief. Hence damages may be 
given as an alternative to injunctive relief when, were it not for the 
disproportionate effect resulting from such relief, it would be proper to 
give the latter form of relief. II 
Even if the prospective solar user is able to prevail in a suit seeking 
injunctive relief, he may still be liable for the payment of damages. 
Furthermore, the theory that disproportionate effect alone should 
be grounds for the denial of an injunction has not been widely ac-
cepted by the courts and has been criticized by some commenta-
tors.20 
3. Laches 
The property owner who has commenced work or completed con-
struction on a solar device may find himself subject to suit by other 
parties to the covenant seeking injunctive relief. In some cases, the 
defense of laches may be available: "[f]ailure to proceed with rea-
sonable promptness to secure injunctive relief against a violation of 
the obligation arising out of a promise respecting the use of land has 
the effect of disabling the one guilty of such neglect from securing 
such relief. "21 
Necessarily, the doctrine of laches will be available as a defense 
18 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 563 (1944). 
" Id., Comment h. 
2. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 685 (1977). 
21 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 562 (1944). 
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only in those limited circumstances where plaintiffs have "sat on 
their rights" and a substantial length of time has passed. Again, 
such a defense will not be available in a suit for damages. 
4. Public Policy 
Perhaps the most promising method for terminating a restrictive 
covenant which interferes with the use of solar devices is the doc-
trine that certain covenants are void as against public policy. Public 
policy has been used by courts to declare contracts void if they are 
clearly injurious to societal interests.22 This theory has also been 
appplied to restrictive covenants.23 Two of the most common types 
of cases where covenants are held to be void as against public policy 
are those involving discrimination on the basis of race24 and those 
which tend to restrain trade.21 
A strong argument could be made that using renewable energy 
sources such as solar is an important national policy. A covenant 
restricting solar use would be void as violative of this policy. Several 
federal statutes could be used by the prospective solar energy user 
to buttress a policy argument. 28 In addition, certain state statutes 
" RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 512, Comment e (1932). 
23 WILLIAMS, supra note 7, § 154.10. 
24 See, e.g., Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 F. 181 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1892), where the court held a 
restrictive covenant prohibiting the sale of the property to a "Chinaman or Chinamen" to be 
void as against public policy. See also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947), where the 
Supreme Court held that private agreements to exclude persons on the basis of race from the 
use of real estate could not be constitutionally enforced by state courts. 
2' See, e.g., Shepherd v. Spurgeon, 365 Mo. 989, 291 S.W.2d 162 (1956), where a covenant 
prohibiting the use of the land for a business purpose was void since it tended to restrain trade 
in contravention of public policy. For a detailed discussion of covenants which are void as 
against public policy, see 7 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL 
PROPERTY § 3161 (1962). 
21 The Solar Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93·473, 88 Stat. 1431, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 5551·566 (1976), explicitly states a national 
policy to promote solar energy: 
Section 5551. Congressional declaration of findings and policy 
(a) The Congress hereby finds that-
(1) the needs of a viable society depend on an ample supply of energy; 
(2) the current imbalance beween domestic supply and demand for fuels and energy 
is likely to persist for some time; 
(3) dependence on nonrenewable energy resources cannot be continued indefinitely, 
particularly at current rates of consumption; 
(4) it is in the Nation's interest to expedite the long·term development of renewable 
and nonpolluting energy resources, such as solar energy; 
(5) the various solar energy technologies are today at widely differing stages of 
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might also be found to contain public policy statements supporting 
the use of solar energy. 27 Inasmuch as a covenant will rarely, if ever, 
development, with some already near the stage of. commercial application and others 
still requiring basic research; 
(6) the early development and export of viable equipment utilizing solar energy, 
consistent with the established preeminence of the United States in the field of high 
technology products, can make a valuable contribution to our balance of trade; 
(7) the mass production and use of equipment utilizing solar energy will help to 
eliminate the dependence of the United States upon foreign energy sources and pro-
mote the national defense; 
(8) to date, the national effort in research, development, and demonstration activi-
ties relating to the utilization of solar energy has been extremely limited; therefore 
(9) the urgency of the Nation's critical energy shortages and the need to make clean 
and renewable energy alternatives commercially viable require that the Nation under-
take an intensive research, development, and demonstration program with an esti-
mated Federal investment which may reach or exceed $1,000,000,000. f 
(b) The Congress declares that it is the policy of the Federal Government to-
(1) pursue a vigorous and viable program of research and resource auesment of solar 
energy as a major source of energy for our national needs; and 
(2) provide for the development and demonstration of practicable means to employ 
solar energy on a commercial scale. 
42 U.S.C. § 5551(a), (b) (1976). Similarly, the Solar Photovoltaic Energy Research, Develop-
ment, and Demonstration Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-590, 92 Stat. 2513, to be codified in 42 
U.S.C. §§ 5581-594, expressed congressional awareness of a diminishing resource base of 
native fouil fuels and declared: 
(b) It is therefore declared to be the policy ofthe United States and the purpose of this 
Act to establish during the next decade an aggressive research, development, and demon-
stration program involving solar photovoltaic energy systems and in the long term to have 
as an objective the production of electricity from photovoltaic systems cost competitive 
with utility-generated electricity from conventional sources. Further, it is declared to be 
the policy of the United States and the purpose of this Act that the objectives of this 
research, development, and demonstration program are-
(1) to double the production of solar photovoltaic energy systems each year during the 
decade starting with fiscal year 1979, measured by the peak generating capacity of the 
systems produced, so as to reach a total annual United States production of solar photo-
voltaic energy systems of approximately two million peak kilowatts, and a total cumula-
tive production of such systems of approximately four million peak kilowatts by fiscal year 
1988; 
(2) to reduce the average cost of installed solar photovoltaic energy systems to $1 per 
peak watt by fiscal year 1988; and 
(3) to stimulate the purchase by private buyers of at least 90 per centum of all solar 
photovoltaic energy systems produced in the United States during fiscal year 1988. 
Id. § 2(b), 92 Stat. 2514-15. 
Additionally, other federal laws encourage the conservation of nonrenewable energy re-
sources and the increased use ofrenewable energy sources. See, e.g., The Energy Conservation 
Standards for New Buildings Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6831-40 (1976), and the National 
Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206 (1978). 
27 See, e.g., The Solar Rights Act of 1978, 1978 CAL. LEGIS. SERvo ch. 1154, pp. 3870-3878. 
Section 2 of the Act states: 
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be directed expressly at solar use, the proponent of a policy argu-
ment would need only attack the application of a restrictive cove-
nant in his situation and would not be compelled to argue against 
the validity of particular aesthetic controls in all cases.28 
C. Shortcomings of Existing Remedies 
Notwithstanding the existence of possible judicial remedies, the 
prospective solar user subject to a restrictive covenant will face 
uncertainty when contemplating the purchase and installation of a 
solar device. Unfortunately if protracted negotiation or litigation 
appears inevitable, the costs attendant to circumventing or over-
coming an aesthetic restriction must be considered in the overall 
cost of a solar device. A solar device may thus become an impra~ti­
cal alternative economically.2t Inevitably, the very uncertainty will 
tend to encourage inertia rather than action. 
The available remedies are hardly clear cut doctrines of law, and 
instead suggest the importance of the particular facts in individual 
cases. Moreover, even in those circumstances where a property 
owner is able to prevail in an action seeking injunctive relief, he may 
find himself liable for the payment of damages. 3D Finally, beyond 
the specific costs attributable to securing the right to construct a 
solar unit, the length of time required to garner releases or obtain 
The use of solar energy systems will reduce the state's dependence on nonrenewable fossil 
fuels, supplement existing energy resources, and decrease the air and water pollution 
which results from the use of conventional energy resources. It is, therefore, the policy of 
the state to encourage the use of solar energy systems .... " 
[d. at 3871. The more substantive provisions of the California Act will be discussed in the 
text of notes 88-98, infra . 
.. In one unreported case, Kraye v. Old Orchard Ass'n, No. C 209453 (Super. Ct. Cal. Jan. 
5, 1979), the court held that a restrictive covenant was "contrary to and in violation of the 
... public policy of the State of California" to the extent that its provisions prohibited the 
roof top installation of solar collector plates, and as such were invalid and unenforceable. [d., 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at 5. The plaintiffs in Kraye phrased their argument 
as follows: 
The present condition of the environment and our natural resources is a matter which 
directly affects all persons not just those involved in a particular activity or contract which 
contravenes public welfare. We all need ... power for our daily lives. The waste [and] 
needless use of our resources and the corresponding cost increases will result in hardship 
and burden to all persons. 
[d., Plaintiff's Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment at 9. The Kraye case is discussed in 
detail in Section IV, B of this article, infra. 
" See note 2, supra. 
30 See text at notes 19-22, supra. 
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judicial sanction could be substantial. When proposed structures 
are subject to the prior approval of a review board, the period of 
time may include submission to and denial by the review board, a 
lengthy wait for trial, and possibly long delays awaiting appeal-all 
to be pursued with scant precedent or encouraging case law. These 
types of legal uncertainties are not likely to foster solar use, and 
forcefully reveal the need for a legislative solution to the problem 
of aesthetic controls in private agreements which militate against 
solar use. 31 
III. AESTHETIC REGULATION BY ZONING 
The general concept ofregulating land use by zoning has received 
widespread acceptance since the landmark decision of the Supreme 
Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty CO.32 In Euclid, the 
Court approved height restrictions as a valid exercise of the police 
power.33 Similarly, in Gorieb v. FOX34 the Court specifically upheld 
setback restrictions on the same grounds.36 Although aesthetics are 
involved to a lesser or greater extent in virtually all decision-making 
concerning the use of land,38 zoning restrictions designed solely and 
specifically for aesthetic control have received less than widespread 
acceptance. 
31 See the discussion of proposed and enacted legislation in text at notes 84-102, infra. 
32 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
33 "There is no serious difference of opinion in respect of the validity of laws and regulations 
fixing the height of buildings within reasonable limits .... " [d. at 388. 
u 274 U.S. 603 (1927). 
as [d. at 609-10. 
H Detailed analysis and consideration of the exact parameters of state power to enact laws 
designed to impose aesthetic controls is beyond the scope of this article. The purpose here is 
to introduce the problem of specific zoning restrictions affecting the potential solar user. As 
one respected commentator has observed: 
Attitudes towards aesthetics, property, and a comprehensive plan are frames ofreference 
not always a conscious part of decision-making in zoning .... "Aesthetics" is a brooding 
omnipresence; notions of the three-dimensional urban environment may be the predomi-
nant consideration underlying a zoning provision rather than the articulated grounds of 
health, safety, or morals. The other side of the coin of police power is "property," reflecting 
the current outcome of the continuing struggles and compromises over the bundle of rights 
and privileges relating to land, which the law protects at anyone point in time. Under 
the sway of new advocates,. courts are discovering that there may be externalities to a local 
regulation analogous to the economic externalities of industry. 
C. HAAR, LAND USING PLANNING 392-93 (3rd ed. 1976). 
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A. The Power to Zone for Aesthetic Purposes and Its 
Application to Solar Devices 
Aesthetic controls imposed by zoning statutes and ordinances 
have been the subject of much controversy. Referred to as "laws 
enacted for the purpose of beauty . . . ,37 these controls initially 
developed as a reaction to the proliferation of billboards but were 
later expanded to include many other types of land use. Early at-
tempts to impose aesthetic controls by legislation were often over-
turned as being beyond the scope of the police power. 38 However, 
some courts have more recently upheld zoning for aesthetic pur-
poses,3' and there is dicta in at least one Supreme Court opinion 
which suggests a basis for these decisions.40 
The Supreme Court case of Berman v. Parker41 involved a chal-
lenge to a District of Columbia redevelopment act; the issue pre-
sented to the Court was whether eminent domain authority could 
be used to acquire non-slum property for public purposes. The 
Court held that eminent domain power could be so used and in an 
opinion by Justice Douglas broadly defined the public welfare pur-
pose for which private property can be condemned: 
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . . The 
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well 
as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that 
the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well 
as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled .... If those who 
govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should 
be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amend-
ment that stands in the way. 4Z 
As one commentator has noted: "this language has had a profound 
effect on the attitude of courts toward land use regulation .... "43 
37 P. RoHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 16.01 (1978) [hereinafter cited as RoHAN]. 
38 [d., § 16.03 . 
.. See, e.g., State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Haw. 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967); People v. 
Stover, 12 N.Y. 2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, appeal dismissed 375 U.S. 42 (1963) . 
.. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
'1 [d . 
.. [d. at 33 . 
.. Williams, Subjectivity, Expression, and Privacy: Problems of Aesthetic Regulation, 62 
MINN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1977). Another commentator has stated "[w]ith ever-increasing fre-
quency, the courts lean more favorably toward a consideration of [a]esthetics as a major 
factor in the enactment ofzoning ordinances under the police power." E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAw 
AND PRACTICE § 4-1 (4TH ED. 1978). 
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Although courts have demonstrated greater willingness to uphold 
zoning statutes and ordinances which attempt to control aesthetics, 
they have reached this result in various ways. On the one hand, 
some courts have recognized that aesthetic considerations are im-
portant, but are simply one of several factors to be reviewed when 
analyzing the validity of a particular zoning restriction.44 These 
courts are thus reluctant to uphold a statute or ordinance solely on 
aesthetic grounds. This approach, described as the majority view, 
requires consideration of several different factors in conjunction 
with aesthetics such as those relating to traditional police power 
concerns as the health, safety and morals of the community. Aes-
thetic controls which also address traffic and fire hazards or relate 
to economic considerations such as increased property values or the 
promotion of tourism are more likely to survive judicial scrutiny 
under this view. 45 
Another approach which has been adopted by some courts is the 
"lowest common denominator" rationale. 48 This theory has been 
summarized as requiring "no need to concern oneself with the really 
difficult problems of deciding which styles of architecture are inap-
propriate and may be excluded from a given area, in order to justify 
regulation of these few types which are, by common consensus, re-
garded as particularly ugly. . . . "47 
Courts in eight other jurisdictions have held that legislation 
which is based solely on aesthetic grounds is valid. 48 The court deci-
sions upholding aesthetics alone have often relied upon the language 
of Berman v. Parker. 4' One important decision in this area was the 
case of People v. Stover. 50 The defendants in Stover had protested 
high taxes by constructing clotheslines in their front yards and 
hanging out old clothes and rags.51 In response, the city enacted an 
.. Note, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: Aesthetics and Objectivity, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1438, 
1440-41 (1973). This article noted that 23 states followed this view: Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vir-
ginia, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia and perhaps Illinois. [d. at 1441 n.13 . 
•• RoHAN, supra note 37, at § 16.04 . 
.. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at § 11.15. 
'1 [d. 
II RoHAN, supra note 37, at § 16.05. These jurisdictions are Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Ohio and Oregon. 
II 348 U.S. 26 (1954). See text accompanying note 41, supra . 
•• 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, appeal dismissed 375 U.S. 42 (1963) . 
• , [d. at 464, 191 N.E.2d at 273. 
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ordinance prohibiting the erection and use of clotheslines in front 
or side yards and enforced this ordinance against the defendants. 
The court upheld the ordinance and found that legislation to pro-
mote aesthetics was a valid use of the police power. 52 
B. Overcoming Restrictive Zoning Provisions 
A prospective solar user faced with a zoning provision which is 
apparently too restrictive to allow for the use of solar devices may 
approach the problem in two ways: a variance could be sought from 
the zoning appeals board or the zoning provision could be directly 
attacked. Usually, the zoning provision would be attacked only after 
failure to receive the requested variance.53 
As one commentator has noted: "zoning ordinances are no differ-
ent from other police power regulations in that they must be reason-
able and fair in their application and must bear a substantial rela-
tion to the public health, safety and morals. It has been well stated 
that zoning ordinances must be reasonable and their reasonableness 
becomes the test of their legality."54 A zoning restriction must be 
found to be reasonably calculated to meet its purpose and not to 
exceed the public need or substantially affect uses which are not 
part of the problem at which the ordinance is aimed. 55 When a 
particular zoning ordinance is found to be unreasonable, it is gener-
52 [d. at 469, 191 N.E.2d at 276. The court, after citing the language of Berman v. Parker 
noted above, see text at note 41 supra, went on to state: 
Cases may undoubtedly arise. . . in which the legislative body goes too far in the name 
of aesthetics ... but the present, quite clearly, is not one of them. The ordinance before 
us is in large sense regulatory rather than prohibitory. It imposes no undue hardship to 
any property owner, for it expressly provides for the issuance of a permit for clotheslines 
in front and side yards in cases where there is practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship 
in drying clothes elsewhere on the premises. Moreover, the ordinance imposes no arbitrary 
or capricious standard of beauty or conformity upon the community. It simply proscribes 
conduct which is unnecessarily offensive to the visual sensibilities of the average person. 
It is settled that conduct which is similarly offensive to the senses of hearing and smell 
may be a valid subject of regulation under the police power. . . and we perceive no basis 
for a different result merely because the sense of sight is involved. 
12 N.Y. 2d at 468, 191 N.E.2d at 275-76. 
53 In the Stover case, the defendants employed a different approach, first seeking a permit 
to maintain their clotheslines, and then upon denial, rather than appealing the decision, 
simply continued their practices. The attack upon the ordinance was a defense in the action 
brought against the defendants for violating the ordinance. See 12 N.Y. 2d at 464-65, 191 
N.E.2d at 273-74. 
54 E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 3-11 (4th ed. 1978) . 
.. [d., at § 3-14. 
1979] RESTRICTION OF SOLAR DEVICES 47 
ally held to be void.51 
These general principles have been applied to the implementation 
of aesthetic controls by zoning but do not resolve specific issues. One 
writer has thus summarized the dilemma: "[t]he initial stumbling 
block to principled judicial treatment of aesthetic regulations ap-
pears to be the idea that the judgments underlying their application 
are too 'subjective' to be adequately dealt with by courts."57 This 
problem of subjectivity centers on the difficulty of determining what 
is aesthetic. The vagueness implicit in an area devoid of ascertaina-
ble judicial standards has been noted in numerous cases and pro-
vides a rationale frequently relied upon by courts which refuse to 
uphold aesthetic regulations. 58 
A prospective solar user could attempt to attack a restrictive 
zoning provision by claiming that it is overbroad, that is, that the 
ordinance in question affects uses such as solar devices which are 
not part ofthe problem at which the ordinance is aimed. Obviously, 
this argument would depend upon the specific wording of the ordi-
nance in dispute and its application in the particular fact situation. 
However, since the question of what is aesthetic is necessarily 
subjective, the argument may be of somewhat limited application. 
The physical appearance of a particular solar device in the context 
of a neighborhood could reasonably be found to be offensive or ugly. 
A major difficulty with attacking restrictive zoning provisions is 
that such attacks may ultimately rest on the argument that aes-
thetic regulation itself is invalid. Such an approach is far too dras-
tic; aesthetic regulations are often desirable to create more pleasant, 
human environments and may serve valid purposes even when ap-
plied to solar devices. For example, requiring landscaping around a 
ground level solar collector or forbidding the construction of a par-
ticularly ugly device, such as one created from beer cans, may en-
hance the community environment. Therefore, a more specific 
solution to the conflict between aesthetic controls imposed by 
zoning and the installation of solar devices is needed, one which is 
tailored to accommodate the conflicting interests involved.59 
.. [d. at § 3-11. 
" Williams, Subjectivity, Expression, and Privacy; Problems of Aesthetic Regulation, 62 
MINN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1977) . 
• 8 Williams, supra note 7, at § 11.04 . 
• , See discussion in text at notes 85-100, infra. 
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IV. CASES AND CONTROVERSIES WHERE AESTHETIC 
RESTRICTIONS AND SOLAR DEVICES HAVE CONFLICTED 
Since solar devices have just recently begun to proliferate, there 
have been few situations where controversies have arisen between 
aesthetic restrictions and the use of solar devices. These controver-
sies have involved aesthetic restrictions contained both in zoning 
ordinances and restrictive covenants. Since these controversies may 
help to indicate the future of the problem and its solution, they will 
be examined in some detail; first the controversies involving zoning 
ordinances will be discussed and then those involving restrictive 
covenants. 
A. Zoning Ordinances 
The only reported case which was found involving the conflict 
between solar devices and zoning ordinances is D'Aurio v. Board of 
Zoning Appeals. 80 In D'Aurio the plaintiffs sought to annul the de-
termination of the board of zoning appeals which denied their appli-
cation for an area zoning variance for the installation of a solar 
heating unit. The zoning ordinance required that each front yard 
have a minimum depth of fifty feet and be free of structures. The 
plaintiffs occupied a corner lot and "[a]1though there appears to 
be sufficient space at the rear of the lot for the installation of a solar 
heating unit ... , the unit apparently would not be most effective 
there."81 In attempting to overturn the denial of a variance, the 
plaintiffs argued as follows: 
the determination under attack denies the petitioners the right to choose 
an energy source; ... it denies them the right to make a normal im-
provement permitted under the use provisions of the zoning ordinance; 
. . . it is contrary to State and Federal energy policy; . . . it represents 
the application of an incorrect test for variance; ... it ignores the 
possibility of granting a variance upon a condition for landscaping; and 
. . . it "represents an unconscionable, selfish and reactionary position 
against energy conservation."82 
The New York court did not find these arguments persuasive and 
noted that "[a] request for an area variance involves a determina-
•• 92 Misc.2d 898, 401 N.Y.S. 2d 425 (Sup. Ct. 1978). 
" Id. at 899, 401 N,.Y.S.2d at 425. 
" Id., 401 N.Y.S.2d at 426. 
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tion as to whether practical difficulties will result from strict com-
pliance with the zoning ordinance and the decision of the local 
zoning board in this regard should be sustained where there is a 
rational basis for its decision."83 In addition the court noted that the 
existence of a self-created hardship did not entitle a property owner 
to a variance; the plaintiffs had not demonstrated practical difficul-
ties or significant economic injury; nor that the board had acted 
arbitrarily, unreasonably, irrationally, or in a manner indicative of 
bad faith." 
The court in D'Aurio did not appear to be receptive to plaintiffs 
arguments supporting the use of solar devices; thus, even if the 
plaintiffs had advanced other arguments, it is unlikely that they 
would have been successfu1.85 However, if there had been an applica-
ble statute such as that in Minnesota which allows the inability to 
use a solar device to be considered a hardship for the purpose of 
granting a variance," a different decision may well have been 
reached. . 
Another situation has arisen where potential solar users have run 
afoul of a zoning ordinance. A homeowner in Arlington, Virginia 
built a solar collector in his front yard, 28 feet from the centerline 
of the street. County regulations require that structures be placed 
fifty feet from street centerlines, and the board of zoning appeals 
refused a variance for the collector. Instead, the board required that 
the collector be moved to the front porch, 45 feet from the center-
line. Although the homeowner indicated that this placement of the 
collector would reduce its effectiveness by 30 to 50 percent, the 
board stated that it did not feel this move would create problems.87 
This controversy has not been brought to court, but it does reveal 
the inevitable conflict between restrictive ordinances and solar de~ 
vices.'8 
.. Id . 
.. Id . 
•• For example, the plaintiffs could have attacked the ordinance restrictions as aesthetic 
requirements and thus too vague. However, this argument would probably not have been 
successful since New York is one of the jurisdictions which had held that legislation based 
solely on aesthetic grounds is valid. See note 48, supra. Furthermore, the ordinance in ques-
tion could be defended as having a substantial relationship to public health and safety. 
II MINN. STAT. ANN. § 394.27(7) (West Supp. 1978). This statute is discussed in detail in 
the text at notes 100-101, infra. 
17 Verdon, Arlington Officials Order Eclipse of Solar Collector, Washington Post, May 3, 
1978, at B-1, B-2. 
IR Another example of this conflict arose in Coral Gables, Florida, where a ban had been 
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B. Restrictive Covenants 
One unreported case, Kraye v. Old Orchard Ass 'n, 89 has dealt 
specifically with the problems posed for prospective solar users by 
aesthetic restrictions in covenants. The plaintiff in Kraye owned 
property subject to a restrictive covenant which stated in relevant 
part: 
In addition to the Architectural Control provided pursuant to Article 
VIII hereof, appliances or installation upon roofs of structures shall not 
be permitted unless they are installed in such manner that they are not 
visible from neighboring property or adjacent streets. 
No building, fence, wall, or other structure or landscaping shall be 
commenced, erected or maintained upon the Properties, nor shall any 
exterior addition to or change or alteration therein or change in the 
exterior appearance thereof or change in landscaping be made until the 
plans and specifications showing the nature, kind, shape, height, mate-
rials, color and location of the same shall have been submitted to and 
approved in writing as to harmony of external design and location in 
relation to surrounding structures and topography by the board or by 
an architectural committee composed by three (3) or more representa-
tives appointed as provided in the By-Laws of the ASSOCIATION.70 
The plaintiffs wanted to install a solar water heater and collector 
plates on their property and the installation of these devices could 
only be accomplished by plaCing the collector plates on the roof. 
Prior to filing their court action, the plaintiffs requested the archi-
tectural committee of the Old Orchard Association to approve the 
installation of a solar water heater and collector. This request was 
denied.71 
The plaintiffs contended that this denial should be overturned 
since the denial was in violation of public policy and (1) deprived 
the plaintiffs of the right to benefit from state statutes which pro-
vided for tax benefits for the installation of solar heating systems, 
(2) deprived the plaintiffs of their property rights to receive air, 
light, or heat from or over on their land, (3) violated the public 
imposed on solar hot water heaters as aesthetic. See cited material from ENERGY FUTURE, in 
note 2, supra. See also, Hill, Thicket of Restrictions Impeding the Use of Solar Devices, N.Y. 
Times, July 4, 1978, at A-4. 
" No. C 209453 (Super. Ct. Cal. Jan. 5, 1979). 7. Id. Stipulation of Facts 3-4. 
71 Id. at 2-3. 
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policy that promotes the installation and use of solar heating and 
collection facilities, (4) the restrictive covenant in question was ar-
bitrary and ambiguous, and (5) due to changed conditions the cove-
nants violated public policy.72 The public policy arguments were 
buttressed in the plaintiffs brief by a citation of sections of the 
California Public Resources Code relating to energy conservation 
and development. 73 Other California statutes supporting this public 
policy argument were also discussed in the amicus brief of the Cali-
fornia Energy Resources Conservation and Development Com mis-
sion.74 
The defendants disputed the plaintiffs contentions and argued 
that the provisions of the covenant were valid and enforceable and 
therefore required the denial of the plaintiffs request for approval 
of the solar devices. The defendants further noted in their brief that 
the fact that the plaintiffs solar devices would be neither unsightly 
nor a nuisance was irrelevant.75 The restrictive covenant "does not 
allow pretty or neighborly installations; if they are visible, they are 
banned."76 With regard to the argument concerning the public pol-
icy in support of solar energy, the defendants countered that there 
was no clear California policy in favor of solar energy and that even 
if such a policy existed, the court should not invalidate the covenant 
on this ground.77 
The California Superior Court issued a final judgment in Kraye 
on January 5, 1979.78 The court found that the covenants in question 
were "invalid and unenforceable" "to the extent that they prohibit 
the roof top installation of solar collector plates."79 While the terse 
judgment issued contained no discussion of the rationale for the 
decision, it can be surmised that the public policy arguments in 
72 [d. Plaintiffs Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment at 3. 
73 [d. at 10-12. The briefs in Kraye were filed early in 1978 and therefore did not include 
arguments based on California's recently enacted statute, The Solar Rights Bill of 1978, 1978 
CAL. LEGIS. SERVo ch. 1154, pp. 3870-78, which addresses aesthetic restrictions and restrictive 
covenants. See discussion in text at notes 88-98, infra. 
74 Kraye v. Old Orchard Ass'n, supra note 69, Memorandum of Points and Authorities of 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment at 10-14. 
7. [d. Defendant's Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment: Points and Authorities in 
Support Thereof at 10-18. 
7. [d. at 10. 
77 [d. at 13-15. 
7. Kraye v. Old Orchard Ass'n., No. C 209453 (Super. Ct. Cal. Jan. 5, 1979), Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
n [d. at 5. 
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favor of the solar devices were convincing.80 
A dispute in Maryland concerning the application of restrictive 
covenants may also give rise to a court decision.81 A homeowner in 
Gaithersburg has been blocked from placing solar collectors on his 
roof by architectural review officials. These officials were quoted as 
having judged the collectors not to be aesthetically pleasing. The 
officials had also noted that other collectors in the area had been 
approved but not when they were in the front of the house as the 
collectors in question would be.82 This controversy is particularly 
interesting because the property owner had obtained a federal grant 
for the installation of a solar energy system.S3 
V. NON-JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS TO AESTHETIC RESTRICTIONS 
AFFECTING SOLAR DEVICES 
The solutions available to a solar user who is or may be faced with 
aesthetic restrictions are not limited to the judicial arguments 
which have been discussed in the preceding sections. Covenants can 
be created which would specifically provide for solar devices and the 
aesthetic standards applicable to them. In addition, legislation 
could attempt to change restrictive covenants and zoning ordi-
nances containing aesthetic restrictions which may currently be in-
terpreted to interfere with the use of solar devices. 
A. Covenants Providing for Solar Devices 
Covenants which provide specifically for solar devices could elim-
inate many of the difficulties associated with aesthetic restrictions 
in covenants. Many of these difficulties have occurred simply be-
cause the covenant involved was drafted before solar technology was 
feasible and contains broad restrictions which may have an unfavor-
able impact on solar installation. Difficulties could still exist if the 
covenant contains a broad grant of authority to an architectural 
.. The court listed among its Conclusions of Law the following: 
Id. 
That the actions of the Architectural Committee of the Old Orchard Association I in 
refusing to grant permission to Plaintiffs to install solar collector plates on the roof of 
Plaintiffs residence is contrary to and violates the public policy of the State of California 
to encourage the use of solar energy systems. 
O! Zon, Aesthetics Issues Puts Cloud over Solar Unit, The Wash. Star, July 12, 1978, at A-
I, A-4. 
M2 Id . 
.. Id. 
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control committee, for even if the covenant were drafted with solar 
technologies in mind, the committee would not necessarily have to 
consider solar devices an acceptable architectural addition. How-
ever, this difficulty could probably be remedied by a careful drafting 
of the language granting this authority to the commission. 
Even if this problem were successfully resolved, there are sub-
stantiallimitations to creating covenants which specifically provide 
for solar devices and the aesthetic standards applicable to them. 
Covenants are most easily created when a new tract of land is open 
for development and this method of resolving the difficulties attend-
ant to aesthetic restrictions affecting solar devices would be of little 
use to more established neighborhoods.84 
B. Legislative Remedies 
Aesthetic restrictions in both restrictive covenants and zoning 
ordinances that could be interpreted to apply to solar devices may 
be changed by legislation. There are two main forms this legislation 
could take: first, statutes or ordinances prohibiting aesthetic restric-
tions in covenants which might serve to restrict or prohibit the use 
of solar devices; and second, statutes limiting municipal authority 
to enact zoning ordinances which interfere with the use of solar 
devices.s5 Obviously, a single statute could contain provisions which 
would prohibit aesthetic restrictions in both covenants and ordi-
nances. 
In addition to these two types of legislation, other less comprehen-
sive statutes might also serve to alleviate some of the difficulties 
associated with aesthetic restrictions and solar devices. For exam-
ple, a statute strongly expressing a public policy in favor of the use 
14 One commentator has expressed a general dissatisfaction with covenants as 
"inappropriate to general commercial or industrial development, although perhaps helpful 
in shopping malls as industrial parks under common single ownership." KRAEMER, supra note 
14, at 61. These limitations were discussed in the context of solar covenants to prohibit the 
shading of surrounding property and thus to protect access to sunlight; however, they would 
also be applicable to the creation of solar covenants with aesthetic standards. 
A more general problem to be faced in connection with modification of restrictive covenants 
to encompass a solar future is the reluctance and skepticism which often greet a novel 
approach in law. Since the Anglo-American system of law rests largely on the use of preced-
ent, the suggested new use of covenants may be less than enthusiastically embraced by 
members of the conveyancing bar. 
Of See, e.g., The Solar Rights Act of 1978, Section 2,1978 CAL. LEGIS. SERvo ch. 1154, pp. 
3870,3871 . 
•• See discussion in text and notes at notes 21-27, supra. 
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of solar devices might encourage some courts to negate aesthetic 
restrictions in covenants and ordinances which would restrict this 
policy.88 Another type of statute which might provide assistance to 
a potential solar user in certain circumstances is one which limits 
the length of time a restrictive covenant is enforceable.87 However, 
both of these types of statutes would be of limited usefulness. The 
first depends largely on judicial willingness to read into a general 
policy statement a prohibition of certain specific restrictions which 
were unmentioned by the statute and the second would require 
lengthy periods of time to become effective. 
California has recently enacted a fairly comprehensive statute 
concerning restrictions in covenants and ordinances which would 
adversely effect solar devices.88 More specifically, the California 
statute would make any covenant which would restrict or prohibit 
a solar energy system void and would preclude the enactment of 
ordinances restricting or prohibiting a solar system.89 
The California legislature found that it was the policy of the state 
to "encourage the use of solar energy systems"90 and further stated 
that the purpose of the act was "to promote and encourage the 
widespread use of solar energy systems and to protect and facilitate 
adequate access to the sunlight which is necessary to operate solar 
energy systems."91 The section of this Act specifically discussing 
covenants states: 
Any covenant, restriction, or condition contained in any deed, con-
tract, security instrument, or other instrument affecting the transfer or 
sale of, or any interest in, real property which effectively prohibits or 
restricts the installation or use of a solar energy system is void and 
unenforceable. 
" See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.20 (West 1947) which states in part: 
[d . 
[a)l1 covenants, conditions, or restrictions hereafter created by any other means, by 
which the title or use of real property is affected, shall cease to be valid and operative 30 
years after the date of the deed, or other instrument ... creating them; and after such 
period of time they may be wholly disregarded. 
.. The Solar Rights Act of 1978, 1978 CAL. LEGIS. SERVo ch. 1154, pp. 3870-78, presently 
codified in various sections of the California Code. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 714, 801, 801.5 
(West Supp. 1979); CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 6580.5, 66473.1, 66475.3 (West Supp. 1979); CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 17959.1 (West Supp. 1979); and CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 17052.5 
(West Supp. 1979) . 
.. CAL. CIV. CODE § 714 (West Supp. 1979). 
'0 The Solar Rights Act of 1978, Section 2, 1978 CAL. LEGIS. SERVo ch. 1154, pp. 3870, 3871. 
" [d. 
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This section shall not apply to provisions which impose reasonable 
restrictions on solar energy systems. However, it is the policy of the state 
to promote and encourage the use of solar energy systems and to remove 
obstacles thereto. Accordingly, reasonable restrictions on a solar energy 
system are those restrictions which do not significantly increase the cost 
of the system or signicantly decrease its efficiency, or which allow for 
an alternative system of comparable cost and efficiency.B2 
The section of the California Act precluding the enactment of 
ordinances restricting or prohibiting solar systems states in part: 
The legislative body of any city or county shall not enact an ordinance 
which has the effect of prohibiting or of unreasonably restricting the use 
of solar energy systems other than for the preservation or protection of 
the public health or safety. This prohibition shall be applicable to 
charter cities since the promotion of the use of nonfossil fuel sources of 
energy, such as solar energy and energy conservation measures, is a 
matter of statewide concern.B3 
This section also includes a provision that it shall not apply to 
ordinances which impose reasonable restrictions on solar energy sys-
tems. I. The language of this provision is virtually identical to the 
provision allowing reasonable restrictions on solar energy systems in 
covenants.15 Both the section on covenants and the section on ordi-
nances provide that the term "solar energy system" shall be defined 
as follows: 
"solar energy system" means either of the following: (1) Any solar collec-
tor or other solar energy device whose primary purpose is to provide for 
the collection, storage, and distribution of solar energy for space heating 
or cooling, or for water heating; or 
(2) Any structural design feature of a building, whose primary purpose 
is to provide for the collection, storage, and distribution of solar energy 
for space heating or cooling, or for water heating.B8 
These California provisions would appear to be applicable to aes-
thetic restrictions contained in covenants or in prospective ordi-
nances although they do not specifically discuss aesthetic restric-
tions. The language used is quite broad and contains only the limi-
.. CAL. CIV. CODE § 714 (West Supp. 1979). 
13 CAL. GOv'T CODE § 65850.5 (West Supp. 1979). 
14 Id. 
" Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 714 (West Supp. 1979) with CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65850.5. 
" CAL. CIV. CODE § 801.5(a)(1), (2) (West Supp. 1979). 
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tation that "reasonable restrictions"D7 are to be allowed. The term 
reasonable restriction is defined narrowly to mean restrictions which 
do not significantly increase the cost of the solar system or allow for 
an alternative system of comparable cost and efficiency.Ds This defi-
nition of reasonable restriction could be interpreted to disallow cer-
tain aesthetic prohibitions on solar collectors. For example, a collec-
tor built from scrap material such as beer cans may be much less 
expensive than other comparable systems and the statutory lan-
guage of the California statute could be interpreted to prohibit any 
limitation on this type of solar device. Although solar devices should 
be encouraged and aesthetic restrictions should not be so inflexible 
that few if any solar devices can meet their requirements, neither 
should all aesthetic restrictions be negated. Perhaps the best ap-
proach would be a balancing of the values presented by aesthetics 
and the use of solar devices. 
A recent Minnesota statute also contains language which could be 
interpreted to offer some solution for the difficulties presented when 
aesthetic restrictions conflict with the use of solar devices. DD The 
Minnesota statute provides for the creation of a board of adjustment 
. which has as one of its duties the authority to order the issuance of 
variances. loo A recent amendment to this statute specifically pro-
vides that "[t]he board of adjustment may consider the inability 
to use solar energy systems a 'hardship' in the granting of vari-
ances. "101 A prospective solar energy user in Minnesota may be able 
to obtain a variance to aesthetic or other requirements in ordinances 
by relying upon this statute. However, the statute does not deal 
directly with aesthetic restrictions and only provides that the inabil-
ity to use solar devices be considered. 
There are few difficulties with a legislature limiting the power of 
municipalities to enact ordinances which restrict solar devices, or in 
providing that the inability to use solar energy systems is to be 
considered a hardship in the granting of variances. Similarly, there 
" CAl.. CIV. CODE § 714 (West Supp. 1979) . 
.. "[Rleasonable restrictions on a solar energy system are those restrictions which do not 
significantly increase the cost of the system or significantly decrease its efficiency, or which 
allow for an alternative system of comparable cost and efficiency." Id . 
.. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 394.27(7) (West Supp. 1978). 
too Id. 
tOt Id. Somewhat similarly, the Minesota provisions concerning variances for subdivisions 
provide "[ulnusual hardship includes, but is not limited to, inadequate access to direct 
sunlight for solar energy systems." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.358(6) (West Supp. 1978). 
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would appear to be few difficulties with a legislature enacting or 
amending its own statutes so that they would not restrict solar 
devices or in providing for prospective limitations on restrictive cov-
enants. However, a zoning statute or ordinance which attempts to 
limit restrictive covenants retrospectively involves difficult legal is-
sues. 102 
Finally, it should be noted that a municipality might negate re-
strictive covenants through its eminent domain authority. However, 
this solution may not be practical, since compensation might be 
.02 The restrictions on land use given by covenants or zoning are separate legal restrictions, 
distinguished by one commentator as follows: "[z]oning laws are enacted under the police 
power in the interest of the public health, safety and welfare; they have no concern whatever 
with building or use restrictions contained in instruments of title and which are created 
merely by private contracts." E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 20-2 (3rd ed. 1965) 
(footnote omitted). Generally, the legal theory which applies when both a restrictive covenant 
and zoning ordinance cover the same subject is that the more restrictive provision applies. 
WILUAMS, supra note 7, at § 154.12. "[I]t is well settled that zoning ordinances cannot 
override, annul, abrogate or relieve land from building restrictions, or covenants placed 
thereon." E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 20-3 (3d ed. 1965) (footnote omitted). This 
legal doctrine could create difficulty if applied to zoning ordinances in statutes attempting 
to restrict covenants which would prohibit solar devices since the covenant would be the most 
restrictive provision. 
However, one writer has suggested that "the mere presence of a less restrictive zoning 
ordinance tends to show that the property in question is better adapted for uses other than 
the restricted use required by the covenant." Note, Legal and Policy Conflicts Between Deed 
Covenants and Subsequently Enacted Zoning Ordinances, 24 VAND. L. REV. 1031, 1033 (1971). 
Furthermore, the validity of more general statutes which impair covenants already in 
existence has been questioned. One review of California's Solar Rights Act of 1978 noted 
potential conflict with the provisions of the United States and California Constitutions pro-
hibiting laws impairing the obligation of existing contracts: 
[Under U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 and Cal. Const. art. I, § 9] [t]he power of the legislature 
to frustrate contractual obligations can be sustained only if the impairment is both reason-
able and necessary to serve an important purpose claimed by the state .... In addition, 
the United States Supreme Court has recently indicated that the extent of impairment 
of the contractual relationship determines the showing of necessity required in order to 
sustain the impairment [see Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 98 S. Ct. 2716, 272~ 
(1978)] and has noted that "[m]inimal alteration of contractual obligations may end the 
inquiry at its first stage" [Id.]. 
The legislature has expressly declared that solar energy is a renewable, nonpolluting 
energy source, the use of which will reduce California's dependence on nonrenewable fossil 
fuels and decrease air and water pollution that result from the employment of conven-
tional energy sources . . . . Therefore, application [of the Act] to void existing cove-
nants, restrictions, or conditions may be valid if the courts consider the development of 
solar energy necessary for the public welfare and the impairment of contractual obliga-
tions minimal . . . . 
Review of Selected 1978 California Legislation, 10 PAC. L. REV. 247, 480-81 (1979) (citations 
omitted). 
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required and the cost in relation to the value of termination would 
be higher than most municipalities could afford to pay.103 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The regulation of aesthetics by restrictive covenants and zoning 
could have a profound, even if unplanned, effect on the use of solar 
devices. Hopefully, many of these problems could be solved by a 
realistic application of covenants and ordinances to these solar de-
vices. Unfortunately, in some cases a judicial determination may be 
the only solution acceptable to both parties. A court decision would 
not necessarily be favorable to the potential solar user since the 
applicable legal doctrines do not adequately cover the new solar 
technology. This was seen in the examination of methods of over-
turning restrictive covenants and zoning provisions. Perhaps the 
best approach to the resolution of these difficulties is the enactment 
of state legislation clarifying the rights of solar users, although this 
legislation would have to be carefully drafted. The present statutes 
on the subject fail to specifically discuss aesthetics and may be 
interpreted so broadly as to allow any solar devices, regardless of 
aesthetic offensiveness. A balancing between the two worthwhile 
goals of using solar devices and maintaining an aesthetically pleas-
ing community is a more practical approach which is urgently 
needed in our crowded and energy depleted environment. 
'03 The issues involved in a taking under eminent domain are extremely complex and 
necessarily beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion of these issues see generally A. 
BOSSELMAN, D. CALLUS, and J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (C.E.Q. 1973). See also Penn Central 
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
